The Philippine National Police (PNP) became a willing instrument of President Duterte’s brutal drug war due to its structural weaknesses and systemic vulnerabilities. Upon the appointment of General Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa as PNP Chief, he introduced the “Tokhang” and “Double Barrel” policies, which aggressively targeted drug users and dealers. Key leadership positions within the PNP were filled with officers loyal to Duterte’s agenda, ensuring minimal resistance to these violent policies. The top brass in the PNP leadership, Napolcom commissioners, and even police academy instructors remained silent as officers carried out reckless arrests, extrajudicial killings, and fabricated evidence under the guise of “nanlaban” or suspects fighting back. Noong panahon ni Digong, kahit isa, walang nangahas magsalita laban sa karahasan at katiwalian ng drug war.
What explains this silence? It starts with PNP’s lack of professionalism.
This complicity highlights the PNP’s struggles with professionalization. Recruitment, appointment, and promotion within the PNP often rely on political patronage and personal connections rather than merit. Many applicants depend on an “MBA” (May Backer Ako) system to secure positions. Similarly, promotions and appointments to lucrative posts are frequently influenced by politicians or elite cliques within the PNP, such as academy batches, fraternal organizations like Masonry, or religious affiliations. These and many other forms of networks foster loyalty to patrons rather than the rule of law or public service.
During the drug war, such patronage systems were exploited. PNPA batches loyal to Duterte were promoted to powerful positions, prioritizing career advancement over legal and ethical standards. Those who previously were assigned in Davao City and had personal relationships with Duterte became trusted henchmen. This explains why some police officials, like now Senator Ronald Dela Rosa, openly admitted their loyalty lies with Duterte rather than the Filipino people.
The lack of professionalism is further rooted in the structural deficiencies of the PNP. Despite earning higher salaries compared to teachers and nurses, police officers are still underpaid relative to their responsibilities and the power they wield. Operational resources are also inadequate. Field officers often lack sufficient budgets for investigations and crime prevention programs, forcing them to depend on local government units (LGUs) for essentials like transportation, gasoline, and equipment.
This financial dependency makes the PNP vulnerable to the influence of local politicians, who wield significant control over police appointments in their jurisdictions. Congress members also leverage their power over the PNP’s budget to secure positions for their allies. Consequently, the PNP becomes susceptible to clientelism and political manipulation, undermining its integrity and independence.
During the drug war, these vulnerabilities were exploited. Financial rewards and promotions were given to officers with the highest numbers of arrests and killings, further incentivizing violence. The reliance on external funding and political rewards drove the PNP down a “murderous path,” as officers sought to meet quotas for personal and career benefits.
The lack of professionalism and the dependency to LGUs provided the backdrop for the bastardization of the PNP.
To prevent another demagogue, like Duterte, from co-opting the PNP, structural and systemic reforms are essential:
1. Professionalize Recruitment and Promotion
• Implement a truly merit-based system for hiring and promotion to eliminate the influence of political patronage. Research shows that police forces with strict meritocratic systems are more professional and less prone to corruption.
2. Financial Independence
• Provide the PNP with sufficient operational budgets to reduce dependence on LGUs and external funding. This includes funding for training, equipment, and day-to-day operations. A well-funded national police force can resist undue political influence and focus on its mandate of public service.
3. Reduce LGU Influence
• Amend the Local Government Code to limit the control of mayors and governors over police appointments. While the code intended to align police priorities with local needs, it has instead turned the PNP into a tool for local political interests.
4. Unified National Police Structure
• Countries with unified, centralized police forces, such as Japan and Singapore, demonstrate higher levels of professionalism and lower levels of corruption. Adopting a similar model in the Philippines can reduce fragmentation and political interference.
5. Strengthen Accountability Mechanisms
• Establish independent oversight bodies to monitor police conduct and ensure accountability. The Napolcom and Internal Affairs Service (IAS) must be empowered to investigate and penalize abuses effectively.
6. Cultural Reorientation
• Reform police training programs to emphasize ethics, human rights, and rule-of-law principles. Studies on police professionalization indicate that consistent training aligned with democratic values fosters integrity and public trust.
The PNP’s involvement in the Duterte drug war reflects the dangerous consequences of weak institutional structures, patronage politics, and insufficient professionalism. To prevent future co-optation, the PNP must undergo comprehensive reforms to ensure independence, professionalism, and accountability. Without these changes, the PNP will remain vulnerable to exploitation by authoritarian leaders and political elites, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
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